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ABSTRACT
Judgment aggregation studies how agent opinions on logically in-
terconnected propositions can be mapped into a collective judg-
ment on the same propositions, and is plagued by impossibility re-
sults. In this paper we study the central notion of independence in
these impossibility results. First, we argue that the distinction be-
tween the premises and conclusions play an important role in the
benchmark examples of judgment aggregation. Second, we con-
sider the notion of independence in judgment aggregation frame-
works, and we observe that the distinction between premises and
conclusion is not taken into account. Third, based on our analysis,
we introduce independence assumptions that distinguish premises
from conclusion. We show that, by introducing new operators that
satisfy our independence assumptions, the problematic impossibil-
ity results no longer hold.
1. INTRODUCTION
Judgment aggregation [12] is an emerging research area in eco-
nomics. It is a formal theory reasoning about the aggregation of
judgments of agents in expert panels, legal courts, boards, and
councils. Judgment aggregation has recently attracted attention in
multiagent systems and artificial intelligence, in particular due to
the relations with belief merging [18], for example for the combi-
nation of opinions of equally reliable agents.
Independence plays a central role in judgment aggregation, since
the aggregation problems arising in judgment aggregation are a
generalization of the aggregation issues discussed in Arrow’s so-
cial choice theory [13, 6]. Whereas social choice theory studies the
aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a collec-
tively preferred alternative, judgment aggregation explores how to
combine agents’ judgments on specific propositions. Just like Ar-
row’s property of “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives” plays a
central role in his famous impossibility results, independence leads
to impossibility results in judgment aggregation.
However, these formal frameworks ignore an important distinc-
tion between aggregating judgments and preferences, which be-
comes apparent in our study of the benchmark examples of these
areas. The benchmark example of social choice theory is the Con-
dorcet paradox. Given a set of agent preferences, we compare each
of the alternatives in pairs. For each pair we determine the winner
by majority voting, and the final social ordering is obtained by a
combination of all partial results. The paradoxical result is that the
pairwise majority rule can lead to cycles. Similarly, when aggre-
gating agents’ judgments on propositions, a seemingly reasonable
procedure, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure
a consistent collective decision. This observation leads to the fol-
lowing research questions of this paper:
1. What is the role of independence in the benchmark exam-
ples of judgment aggregation? We argue that premises and
conclusions must be distinguished.
2. What is the role of independence in judgment aggregation
frameworks? We illustrate that the distinction between premises
and conclusions does not play a role in the frameworks.
3. How to bridge the gap between the individual examples and
the frameworks? We propose weaker independence assump-
tions and we show their consistency by defining operators for
them.
Since independence is the central notion in judgment aggrega-
tion, and the literature on judgment aggregation (like social choice
theory) concentrate on formal impossibility results rather than dis-
cussing the examples in depth, a large part of this paper is con-
cerned with analyzing and criticizing the benchmark examples and
existing frameworks. We use the framework of Mongin [15] to for-
mulate our new independence assumptions, because his notion of
independence of irrelevant propositional alternatives enables us to
define our assumption and operators based on a partition between
premise, intermediate and conclusion propositions.
As an appetizer of the results in this paper, consider our notion of
conclusion dictator. In this judgment aggregation operator, one of
the agents is a dictator for the conclusion, in the sense that whatever
his judgment on the conclusion, it will be the collective judgment.
However, for the premises, he may follow the majority in most of
the cases. In an analogous way, a conclusion majority operator is
defined, which follows the majority for the conclusion, but not al-
ways for the premises. We show that these operators satisfy our
weakened notion of independence, without satisfying the other in-
dependence assumptions discussed in the literature.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss
independence in judgment aggregation examples, and we argue for
the importance of distinguishing premises from conclusions. In
Section 3 we discuss and criticize the independence assumptions
in judgment aggregation frameworks of List and Pettit [13], and of
Mongin [15]. In Section 4 we introduce our weakened indepen-
dence assumptions, and we show by two operators that they are
compatible with the other assumptions of the framework.
2. INDEPENDENCE
In this section we first present the original aggregation paradox
from which judgment aggregation originated. We then discuss var-
ious other examples from the literature. The purpose is to examine
the independence (and, especially, dependence!) relations among
propositions in different instances of judgment aggregation.
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Agents are required to express judgments (in the form of yes/no
or, equivalently, 1/0) over propositions that have different status.
More specifically, some propositions (called premises) provide the
reasons to some other propositions (the conclusions). A typical
condition imposed on the aggregation procedure is that it should
treat all propositions in an even-handed way. However, we notice
that premises are often independent from each other, but they are
never independent from the conclusion (and vice versa). This ob-
servation is the basis for the properties of premise and conclusion
independence introduced in Section 4.
To represent the distinction between premise and conclusion in
our language, and in contrast to the existing literature on judgment
aggregation, we distinguish between premise variables a, b, c, . . .,
intermediate variables e, f, g, . . . and conclusion variables x, y, . . ..
Logical constraints relate premises to intermediate variables, inter-
mediate variables to conclusion variables, or directly premises vari-
ables to conclusion variables.
2.1 Doctrinal paradox
The problem of judgment aggregation was first identified by Ko-
rnhauser and Sager [9, 10]. In their example, a court has to make
a decision on whether a person is liable of breaching a contract
(proposition x, or conclusion). The judges have to reach a verdict
following the legal doctrine. This states that a person is liable if and
only if there was a contract (first premise a) and there was a conduct
constituting breach of such a contract (second premise b). The legal
doctrine can be formally expressed by the rule (a ∧ b) ↔ x. Each
member of the court expresses her judgment on the propositions a,
b and x such that the rule (a ∧ b)↔ x is satisfied.
Suppose now that the three members of the court make their
judgments according to Table 1.
a b x = (a ∧ b)
Judge A 1 0 0
Judge B 0 1 0
Judge C 1 1 1
Majority 1 1 0
Table 1: Doctrinal paradox. Premises: a = There was a con-
tract, b = There was conduct constituting breach of such a con-
tract. Conclusion: x = (a∧b) = There was a breach of contract.
Each judge expresses a consistent opinion, i.e. she says yes to x
if and only if she says yes to both a and b. However, proposition-
wise majority voting (consisting in the separate aggregation of the
votes for each proposition a, b and x via majority rule) results in a
majority for a and b and yet a majority for ¬x. This is an inconsis-
tent collective result, in the sense that {a, b,¬x, (a ∧ b) ↔ x} is
inconsistent in propositional logic. The paradox lies in the fact that
majority voting can lead a group of rational agents to endorse an
irrational collective judgment. The literature on judgment aggrega-
tion refers to such problem as the doctrinal paradox.
As illustrated in Section 2.3.1, the relevance of such aggregation
problems goes beyond the specific court example, because it ap-
plies to all situations in which individual binary evaluations need
to be combined into a group decision.
The paradox originates from the fact that it is assumed that the
aggregation on the premises should be logically equivalent to the
aggregation on the conclusion, i.e. the group of agents should say
yes to x if and only if the group says yes both to a and b. How-
ever, by applying the majority rule on each proposition separately,
the logical relations between premises and conclusion are disre-
garded. The aggregation of logically related propositions into a
consistent outcome cannot be achieved by imposing that all propo-
sitions should be treated independently of each other. The inde-
pendence condition that is imposed on the aggregation rules in the
literature is a reminiscence of the independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives in social choice theory. However, in the aggregation of
judgments, where the propositions are connected, the independence
condition is the source of the inconsistent group outcomes.
2.1.1 Premise vs conclusion-based procedure
The first two ways to avoid the inconsistency that have been sug-
gested are the premise-based procedure and the conclusion-based
procedure [17, 3]. According to the premise-based procedure, each
agent votes on each premise. The conclusion is then inferred from
the rule (a ∧ b) ↔ x and from the judgment of the majority of
the group on a and b. In case the judges of the example followed
the premise-based procedure, the defendant would be declared li-
able of breaching the contract. In the premise-based procedure, the
aggregation of a premise proposition is still independent from the
other premise propositions, but the aggregation of the conclusion
is not. For example, if judge A and judge B both would argue that
there was no contract and there was no conduct constituting breach
of such a contract, then the conclusions of the individual judges
would be like in Table 1. Yet, unlike Table 1, there would be no
inconsistent collective judgment on a, b and x, and the defendant
would be declared not liable. The paradox in Table 1 is due to the
fact that judges A and B agree on the fact that there was no breach
of contract, but for different reasons. Therefore, the premises and
conclusions are not independent and cannot be treated as such.
According to the conclusion-based procedure, the judges decide
privately on a and b and only express their opinions on x pub-
licly. The judgement of the group is then inferred from applying
the majority rule to the agent judgments on x. The defendant will
be declared liable if and only if a majority of the judges actually
believes that she is liable. In the example, contrary to the premise-
based procedure, the application of the conclusion-based procedure
would free the defendant. Moreover, no reasons for the court deci-
sion could be supplied. In the conclusion-based procedure, if there
are multiple conclusion propositions, then the aggregation of a con-
clusion proposition is independent of the other conclusions. Since
there is no aggregation of the premises, the procedure says noth-
ing about the dependence or independence between premises and
conclusions.
2.2 Discursive dilemma
The discursive dilemma [17] is a variant of the doctrinal para-
dox, in which the judges also vote on the logical connection rule
x↔ (a ∧ b). In Table 2, we model the rule using an intermediate
variable e, which represents that the rule is neither a premise nor a
conclusion, but a relation between them. The discursive dilemma
in Table 2 is a generalization of the doctrinal paradox in Table 1,
in the sense that in the latter all agents are assumed to vote for the
rule. By contrast, in the case of the doctrinal paradox it is possible
that some of them vote against it. Consequently, a general frame-
work to model examples like the discursive dilemma in Table 2 is
more restricted than a general framework to model examples like
the doctrinal paradox in Table 1. This is because, unlike in the
doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma explicitly considers the
notion of a rule.
We are able to discuss the independence relations in the discur-
sive dilemma, due to the distinction between premise and conclu-
sion propositions, and extending it with the intermediate proposi-
tion e. For instance, a premise-conclusion based procedure can be
a b x↔ (a ∧ b) x
Judge A 1 0 1 0
Judge B 0 1 1 0
Judge C 1 1 1 1
Majority 1 1 1 0
Table 2: Discursive dilemma. Premises: a = There was a con-
tract, b = There was conduct constituting breach of such a con-
tract. Intermediate variable: e = (x ↔ (a ∧ b)) = legal doc-
trine. Conclusion: x = There was a breach of contract.
defined. This, at the best of our knowledge, has not been discussed
explicitly in the literature. In this procedure, each agent votes on
each premise and conclusion, and the intermediate variable is then
inferred from the rule e ↔ ((a ∧ b) ↔ x) and from the judgment
of the majority of the group on a, b and x. In the example given
in Table 2, the aggregated judgment would reject the rule. The
premises and conclusions are independent, but they both depend
on the intermediate propositions.
Finally, in the literature on judgment aggregation there is no dis-
cussion of what voting for or against a rule means. Consider, for
example, the rule “If carbon dioxide emissions are above thresh-
old k, then there will be global warming” (see Section 2.3.4). The
conditional a→ x is false when it is the case that “carbon dioxide
emissions are above threshold k, and there will be no global warm-
ing”. However, it is questionable if this is what an agent means
when stating that a → x is false. The fact that, in many contexts,
the material interpretation of the implication operator is not natu-
ral, has been observed in [5], and a characterization of admissible
quota rules on a large class of agendas with subjunctive implica-
tions is given.
2.3 Variants
The importance of the judgment aggregation literature is based
on various generalizations of the doctrinal paradox and the discur-
sive dilemma. It has been used outside of the legal domain, other
propositions have been voted on, it has been related to other para-
doxes in the social science literature, and other rules than the ma-
jority rule have been considered.
2.3.1 Beyond the legal domain
Some of the other examples given in the literature with precisely
the same logical structure as the original contract paradox have
been listed in Table 3. Some of them come from other domains
than the legal one. For instance, Bovens and Rabinowicz [2] il-
lustrate the case of a hiring committee that agrees that someone is
worthy of tenure if he or she is worthy of tenure on teaching and
worthy of tenure on research.
In the examples, it seems relevant whether the agents are more
concerned with the outcome of the vote or with the need of pro-
viding justifications for their final decision. If the agents of the
hiring committee are external to the institution where the candidate
will be hired, they may be more inclined to follow a procedure that
makes explicit the reasons for the final decision, like the premise-
based procedure. Instead, when the decision-makers work for the
same institution, they may be view their conclusion more relevant
and, therefore, let the aggregation of the premises depend on that
conclusion.
In practice, it seems very hard to construct examples where such
dependency considerations do not play a role. Consider, for in-
stance, a situation from knowledge discovery where expert opin-
ions from scientists must be aggregated. One may expect that scien-
tists would give their opinion without any strategic considerations
in mind. However, collective decisions may influence their pres-
tige and their abilities to attract future funding, and therefore also
in these cases they may be biased towards a more conclusion-based
procedure.
2.3.2 Three-premise examples
Nehring [16] presents a variant with three premises from the le-
gal domain, and List and Pettit [13] discuss an example from group
decision making. These are both summarized in Table 5. On the
one hand, as argued by Chapman for the original doctrinal paradox,
in a legal domain example as in [16], a premise-based approach
seems more appropriate. Indeed, the legal code requires the judges
to provide arguments for their decision. On the other hand, in an
example like the one in [13], a conclusion-based approach seems
defendable since the agents are more affected by the final decision
than by the reasons that supported that decision.
Table 4 illustrates an instance of the Paretian Dilemma [16] with
three premises. In a Paretian Dilemma the premise-based proce-
dure contradicts a unanimously supported conclusion.
a b c x
Agent 1 1 0 1 0
Agent 2 0 1 1 0
Agent 3 1 1 0 0
Majority 1 1 1 0
Table 4: Premises: a = Serious danger?, b = effective measure?,
c = Bearable loss? Conclusion: x = Pay sacrifice?
2.3.3 Disjunctive variants
Chapman [3] considers the disjunctive variant of a doctrinal para-
dox, i.e. a case in which a majority would reject both the atomic
propositions a and b as false, and yet accept the compound disjunc-
tion (a ∨ b) as true. Suppose that a panel of three judges have to
decide whether a given tribunal had jurisdiction to hear some legal
dispute. Suppose as well that there are only two ways for the tri-
bunal to take jurisdiction. Let us call these two ways J1 and J2,
each of which, if available, is sufficient to settle the jurisdictional
dispute. Thus, there will be jurisdiction J if and only if (J1 ∨ J2).
Table 6 shows the votes of the three judges and the resulting major-
ity voting on each of the three propositions that are in dispute.
While Judges A and B form a majority in favor of finding ju-
risdiction J , they find this for conflicting reasons. Moreover, the
problem is that the court reaches the majority view that neither J1
nor J2 are adequate reasons for that tribunal to take jurisdiction.
a b x = (a ∨ b)
Judge A 1 0 1
Judge B 0 1 1
Judge C 0 0 0
Majority 0 0 1
Table 6: Premises: a = There is J1, b = There is J2. Conclusion:
x = There is J (i.e., (J1 ∨ J2)).
This example shows once more that if the premise variables a
and b are independent from each other, they are not independent
on the conclusion x (and vice versa). To demand an aggregation
rule that satisfies independence in an aggregation problem like this,
inevitably opens the way to inconsistent collective judgments.
a b x
There was a contract There was conduct constituting breach of such a contract There was a breach of contract.
[7] The defendant killed the victim The defendant was sane at the time The defendant is guilty
[4] Iraq hides weapons of mass destruction The war can be won with acceptable military losses Invasion
[2] Candidate is worthy of tenure on teaching Candidate is worthy of tenure on research The candidate is worthy of tenure
tout court
Table 3: Doctrinal paradox: variants
a b c x
[13] Serious danger? Effective measure? Bearable loss? Pay sacrifice?
[16] Defendant had duty to take care Defendant behaved negligently His negligence caused damage Damages are due
Table 5: Three premise examples: variants
2.3.4 Implication based examples
An aggregation paradox variant with an implication has been
given in [6]. The example considers a three-member committee
that has to express agent and collective judgments on three con-
nected propositions:
a: Carbon dioxide emissions are above the threshold k.
a→ x: If carbon dioxide emissions are above the threshold k, then
there will be global warming.
x: There will be global warming.
a e = (a→ x) x
Agent 1 1 1 1
Agent 2 1 0 0
Agent 3 0 1 0
Majority 1 1 0
Table 8: Premise: a, Intermediate e = a→ x, Conclusion: x
As shown in Table 8, the first agent accepts all three proposi-
tions; the second accepts a but rejects a → x and x; the third
accepts a → x but rejects a and x. Then, the judgments of each
agent are individually consistent, and yet the majority judgments on
the propositions are inconsistent: a majority accepts a, a majority
accepts a→ x, but a majority rejects the conclusion x.
If we analyze this example in terms of premise and conclusion,
we see that there is a premise a (or cause), a rule (a, x) (or norm)
and a conclusion x (or evidence). a and x are clearly not indepen-
dent. Requiring that these three issues should be treated in the same
way and such that the group outcome on each of the three issues
is independent on the judgments on the two others is untenable.
The premise variable is not independent from the norm a → x or
from the conclusion (and vice versa). As also the discussion on the
Jørgensen’s dilemma in deontic logic [8] shows, to look at a → x
as a proposition is a sure source of trouble.
2.4 Independence
In the contract example, it is arguable that (a∧b)↔ x should be
in the agenda of the issues on which the judges have to vote. Judges
must obey to the legal doctrine when they deliberate. To accept or
reject the legal doctrine is not an option for the judges. Likewise,
in most of the examples found in the literature, the rules are fixed
before voting and the agents are committed to express opinions that
do not violate such rules.
Despite the apparent generality of the judgment aggregation prob-
lem, surprisingly the examples are often rather biased. For in-
stance: the original contract paradox is based on a constitutive
norm defining a legal concept, and thus the issue of how to formal-
ize legal reasoning becomes part of the aggregation problem. In or-
der to fully understand the example, it is necessary to know that the
court needs to justify its decision. On the other hand, many other
examples are based on general decision problems, where other con-
sideration may play a role.
Generally speaking, it seems that in some situations, we can
make a choice between the premise and conclusion-based proce-
dures. In legal reasoning a premise-based procedure may be called
for, whereas in decision-theoretic problems a conclusion-based pro-
cedure may be favored. However, this cannot represent a solution
to the discursive dilemma for the following reasons: 1. If in legal
reasoning a premise-based procedure is used, what is the scope of
introducing legal ontology defining institutional facts? Likewise,
if in decision theoretic problems a conclusion-based procedure is
opted for, why should people be concerned about the arguments?
2. The dilemma is not which one of these two extremes we should
opt for, but the fact that we have only the choice between these two
extremes. 3. For some examples, it is less clear whether a premise
or conclusion-based procedure should be preferable.
In order to aggregate premises and conclusions, we need to better
understand the relation between them. To study how premises and
conclusion are related amounts to investigate the justification for
the independence conditions found in the literature on judgment
aggregation. This is what we address in the next section.
3. JUDGMENT AGGREGATION
3.1 The first impossibility theorem
In this section we introduce the formal framework of judgment
aggregation. A set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 3,
has to make judgments on logically interconnected propositions.
L is a language with atomic propositions a, b, c, . . ., including the
complex formulas ¬a, (a ∧ b), (a ∨ b), (a→ b), (a↔ b).
The set of issues on which the judgments have to be made is
called agenda and is denoted by Φ ⊆ L. The agenda is closed
under negation: if a ∈ Φ, then ¬a ∈ Φ. A subset J ⊆ Φ is called
(agent or collective) judgment set and it is the set of propositions
believed by the agents or the group. A judgment set is consistent if
it is a consistent set in L, and is complete if, for any a ∈ L, a ∈ J
or ¬a ∈ J . An n-tuple (J1, J2, . . . , Jn) of agent judgment sets is
called profile.
A judgment aggregation rule F assigns a collective judgment set
J to each profile (J1, J2, . . . , Jn) of agent judgment sets.
As in social choice theory, a set of rational and desirable condi-
tions are imposed on the aggregation rules and then, typically, an
impossibility result is derived. The first impossibility theorem of
judgment aggregation appeared in [13]. It states that there exists no
a b x = a ∨ b
(1) There is J1 (2) There is J2 (3) There is J (i.e., (J1 ∨ J2))
The product was defectively manufactured The product was sold with an inadequate warning Recovery of damages from the defendant
manufacturer
Table 7: Disjunctive examples: variants
a e = (a→ x) x
[6] CO2 emissions above threshold k If CO2 emissions above threshold k, then global warming There will be global warming
[14] Current CO2 emissions lead to If current CO2 emissions lead to We should reduce
global warming global warming, then we should reduce CO2 emissions CO2 emissions.
Table 9: Implication examples: variants
aggregation rule F satisfying the following conditions:
Universal Domain (UD): the domain of F is the set of all pro-
files of consistent and complete judgment sets.
Anonymity: For any profiles (J1, . . . , Jn), (J ′1, . . . , J ′n) in the
domain that are permutations of each other, F (J1, . . . , Jn) =
F (J ′1, . . . , J
′
n). Intuitively, this means that all agents have equal
weight.
Systematicity: For any a, b ∈ Φ and any profiles (J1, . . . , Jn),
(J ′1, . . . , J
′
n) in the domain, if [for all i ∈ N, a ∈ Ji ⇐⇒ b ∈
J ′i], then [a ∈ F (J1, . . . , Jn) ⇐⇒ b ∈ F (J ′1, . . . , J ′n)]. This
condition ensures that the collective judgment on each proposition
depends only on the agent judgments on that proposition, and that
the aggregation rule is the same across all propositions.
Let us illustrate systematicity with an example. The agent evalu-
ations of a and b in the two situations below are swapped. System-
aticity ensures that the collective judgment on a in the first situation
is the same as the group outcome on b in the second situation (they
are both mapped into 1).
a b a ∧ b
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
1 0 0
a b a ∧ b
1 0 0
0 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 0
Table 10: Systematicity
Systematicity is a very strong condition. Not only systematicity
requires that the collective judgment of each proposition should de-
pend exclusively on the agent judgments on that propositions (and
not on other — assumed to be independent — propositions), but
also that the way in which the collective judgment is determined
should be the same across all the propositions.
3.2 Independence condition relaxed
Among the conditions imposed on F , systematicity is the most
controversial. In subsequent impossibility results, systematicity
has been weakened to the independence of irrelevant alternatives,
which captures the independence condition imposed on preference
aggregation functions in social choice theory:
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): For any a ∈ Φ
and any profiles (J1, . . . , Jn), (J ′1, . . . , J ′n) in the domain, if [for
all i ∈ N, a ∈ Ji ⇐⇒ a ∈ J ′i], then [p ∈ F (J1, . . . , Jn) ⇐⇒
a ∈ F (J ′1, . . . , J ′n)].
IIA is systematicity without the neutrality condition, requiring
that all propositions are equally treated. As in Table 10, the agent
evaluations for a and b in the two situations in Table 11 have been
swapped. The collective judgment on a (resp. b) still depends only
on the agent opinions on a (resp. b). However, because the neu-
trality part of systematicity has been dropped, it is possible to have
different aggregation rules on different propositions. For instance,
in the table below, we apply majority voting on a and minority vot-
ing on b:
a b a ∧ b
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
1 0 0
a b a ∧ b
1 0 0
0 1 0
1 1 1
1 0 0
Table 11: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
Yet, IIA remains a contentious condition, and its main justifica-
tion is that it prevents possible manipulations. The urge for a theory
of judgment aggregation on normatively defensible conditions has
been claimed by Mongin [15]:
[IIA] remains open to a charge of irrationality. One
would expect society to pay attention not only to the
agents’ judgments on φ, but also to their reasons for
accepting or rejecting this formula, and these reasons
may be represented by other formulas than φ in the
agent sets. Before deciding that two profiles call for
the same acceptance or rejection, society should in gen-
eral take into account more information than is sup-
posed in the condition. ([15] p.7)
Thus, Mongin recognizes that propositional formulas are not in-
dependent when they share propositional variables. This leadsMon-
gin to weaken the IIA. Nevertheless, as we shall see soon, his new
independence condition is not weak enough to ensure possibility
results.
Mongin introduces a new IIA condition that is restricted to the
atomic propositions of the language. It is then shown that this new
condition together with unanimity and universal domain give a dic-
tatorial aggregation rule.
The formal framework of [15] considers a setP = {a1, . . . , am,
. . .} of proposition variables (p.v.) of L. As usual, literals are ei-
ther p.v. or negations of p.v.. A literal value for any a ∈ P is a
choice between a or ¬a and is denoted by a˜. If Φ is an agenda,
Φ0 = Φ ∩ P .
DEFINITION 1. For any a, b ∈ Φ0, we say that a˜, b˜ are con-
nected in terms of a k-disjunction of literals if Φ contains some dis-
junction of k disjuncts, among which a˜ and b˜, the other disjuncts
— if there are any — being also literals. To illustrate, a˜ and b˜ are
connected in terms of a 2-disjunction iff Φ contains a˜ ∨ b˜, and in
terms of a 3-disjunction if Φ contains b˜ ∨ c˜ ∨ a˜ for some literal c˜.
([15] p.4)
The following Closure Condition on Φ is defined:
DEFINITION 2. (i) Closure Under Propositional Variable: if
φ ∈ Φ, and p ∈ P appears in φ, then a ∈ Φ0. (ii) Limited
Disjunctive Closure: in every 3-element subset of Φ0, there is an
element a such that each literal value of a is connected in terms
of 2- or 3-disjunctions with each literal value of the other two ele-
ments, b and c. (iii) The previous condition holds with at least one
3-disjunction, i.e., if {a, b, c} ⊆ Φ0, there is at least one choice of
literals a˜, b˜, c˜ for which a˜ ∨ b˜ ∨ c˜ ∈ Φ. ([15] p.4)
Hence, for example, the agenda of the discursive dilemma as in
Table 2 would contain the literals: a, b, x,¬a,¬b,¬x, the rule x↔
(a∧b)would be expanded as¬a∨¬b∨x, a∨¬x, b∨¬x. Finally, the
agenda would contain more constraints: a∨x, b∨x,¬a∨¬b∨¬x.
Independence of Irrelevant Propositional Alternatives (IIPA):
∀a ∈ Φ0,∀(J1, . . . , Jn), (J ′1, . . . , J ′n) in the domain [for all i ∈
N , a ∈ Ji ⇐⇒ a ∈ J ′i ]⇒ [a ∈ J ⇐⇒ a ∈ J ′]. Intuitively, IIPA
amounts to reserving IIA only to the p.v.
Table 12 illustrates IIPA, where the independence condition holds
only for the propositional variables. Hence, the complex formula
(a ∧ b)↔ x is mapped (by a hypothetical aggregation rule) into 1
in the first case and into 0 in the second situation.
a b (a ∧ b)↔ x x
1 1 0 0
1
1
1
a b (a ∧ b)↔ x x
1 1 0 0
1
1
0
Table 12: Independence of Irrelevant Propositional Alterna-
tives
The last condition imposed by Mongin is the following, intu-
itively desirable, unanimity preservation:
Unanimity Preservation (UP): For all φ ∈ Φ and all (J1, . . . , Jn)
in the domain, for all i ∈ N,φ ∈ Ji ⇒ φ ∈ J .
It is important to observe that, unlike IIPA that is imposed only
on the p.v. of the agenda, UP is imposed on all formulas in the
agenda Φ. The best way to explain UP is with a counterexample.
In Table 13 propositionwise majority voting on (a∧ b∧ c) violates
UP. Though the agents unanimously voted against (a ∧ b ∧ c), the
majority outcome on the atomic propositions will force the group
to accept (a ∧ b ∧ c) (Paretian Dilemma).
a b c (a ∧ b ∧ c)
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
Table 13: Unanimity Preservation
We can now finally state Mongin’s impossibility theorem:
THEOREM 1. Assume that |Φ| ≥ 3 and that the Closure Con-
dition (i), (ii), and (iii) hold. If F satisfies IIPA and UP, F is dicta-
torial.
An aggregation function F is dictatorial if there is an agent i (the
dictator) among the voters, such that, for every profile (J1 . . . Jn),
Jj = F (J1 . . . Jn).
a b c
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
a b c
1 1 1
1 0 0
1 1 1
1 0 0
Table 14: Dictatorship
In Table 14, no matter what the other agents in the group say, the
group judgment coincides with the agent judgment (1, 0, 0). That
agent is the dictator.
Anti-dictatorship does not forbid a collective outcome to be one
of the agents’ judgment sets. Rather, an aggregation rule is dictato-
rial if the same agent judgment is selected to be the group judgment
for any profile in the domain.
4. INDEPENDENCE RECONSIDERED
As we have seen, the impossibility results in judgment aggrega-
tion make use of independence conditions, either in the strong form
of systematicity or in the weaken form of the independence of ir-
relevant alternatives or even in the further weakened independence
of irrelevant propositional alternatives. This suggests that relaxing
such conditions is also a way to achieve more possibility results.
This is precisely what we explore in this section. More specifi-
cally, we introduce further weakened independence conditions: a
premise independence of irrelevant propositional alternatives and
a conclusion independence of irrelevant propositional alternatives.
The motivation is to define independence conditions that capture
the intuition that premises are often independent from each other,
but are not independent from the conclusion (and vice versa).
4.1 Strong and weak premise independence
The formal framework we use to formalize our new indepen-
dence assumptions is Mongin’s framework, extended with the par-
titioning of the p.v. into three classes. Let us decompose Φ0 as the
union of the p.v. that are premises, p.v. that are intermediate, and
of the p.v. that are conclusions of the aggregation problem at hand:
Φ0 = Φ
P
0 ∪ΦI0 ∪ΦC0 . In this section we discuss only the case that
there are no intermediate propositions, ΦI0 = ∅.
Strong Premise Independence (SPI): ∀a ∈ ΦP0 ,∀(J1, . . . , Jn),
(J ′1, . . . , J
′
n) in the domain [for all i ∈ N , a ∈ Ji ⇐⇒ a ∈ J ′i ]∧
[∀x ∈ ΦC0 , x ∈ J ⇐⇒ x ∈ J ]⇒ [a ∈ J ⇐⇒ a ∈ J ′].
Table 15 shows two profiles with the same agent judgments on
the premise b. However, since the collective judgment on the con-
clusion x is different in the two profiles (it is 0 in the first profile
and 1 in the second), also the collective judgments on b in the two
profiles will not coincide.
This is a first proposal to relax the independence condition in
such a way to capture the logical dependency between premises and
conclusion. IIA fails in this example since the collective evaluation
of b in the first profile is different from the collective judgment of b
in the second profile.
a b x = a ∧ b
1 0 0
0 1 0
1 1 1
1 0 0
a b x = a ∧ b
1 0 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
Table 15: Strong Premise Independence
We can further relax SPI and impose that, given any two pro-
files, the collective evaluations of a premise in the two profiles co-
incide if and only if the agent judgments on that premise and on
the conclusion are the same in the two profiles. Formally, this can
be expressed as follows:
Weak Premise Independence (WPI): ∀a ∈ ΦP0 ,∀(J1, . . . , Jn),
(J ′1, . . . , J
′
n) in the domain [for all i ∈ N , a ∈ Ji ⇐⇒ a ∈ J ′i ]∧
[∀x ∈ ΦC0 , ∀i ∈ N , x ∈ Ji ⇐⇒ x ∈ J ′i ]⇒ [a ∈ J ⇐⇒ a ∈ J ′].
Table 16 shows two profiles with the same agent judgments on
the premise b. However, since the agent judgments on the conclu-
sion x is different in the two profiles (it is 0 for the second agent in
the first profile and 1 in the second), also the collective judgments
on b in the two profiles will not coincide. Strong premise indepen-
dence fails in this example since the collective evaluation of b in
the first profile is different from the collective judgment of b in the
second profile, whereas the collective judgment of x is the same.
a b x = (a ∧ b)
1 0 0
0 1 0
1 1 1
1 0 0
a b x = (a ∧ b)
0 0 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
0 1 0
Table 16: Weak premise independence
4.2 Strong and weak conclusion independence
The strong and weak conclusion independence assumptions are
defined analogously to the premise independence assumptions. Since
this assumption trivially holds for any example in which there is
only one conclusion, and this holds for all the benchmark examples
in the literature, we do not present any examples.
Strong Conclusion Independence (SCI): ∀x ∈ ΦC0 ,∀(J1, . . . , Jn),
(J ′1, . . . , J
′
n) in the domain [for all i ∈ N , x ∈ Ji ⇐⇒ x ∈ J ′i ]∧
[∀a ∈ ΦP0 , a ∈ J ⇐⇒ a ∈ J ]⇒ [x ∈ J ⇐⇒ x ∈ J ′].
WeakConclusion Independence (WCI): ∀x ∈ ΦC0 ,∀(J1, . . . , Jn),
(J ′1, . . . , J
′
n) in the domain [for all i ∈ N , x ∈ Ji ⇐⇒ x ∈ J ′i ]∧
[∀a ∈ ΦP0 , ∀i ∈ N , a ∈ Ji ⇐⇒ a ∈ J ′i ]⇒ [x ∈ J ⇐⇒ x ∈ J ′].
4.3 Conclusion-based procedure revised
In the revised conclusion-based procedure we consider in this
section, the judgment on a takes the same evaluation as the conclu-
sion x unless there is unanimity on a. The collective judgments on
b and x are obtained by propositionwise majority voting. In con-
trast to the conclusion-based procedure discussed in the literature
and in Section 2.1.1, we not only decide by majority but we also
give an explanation for it. The explanation in this case is that b is
considered in some sense more important and therefore follows the
majority, whereas a is in some sense less important and therefore
may be decided against the majority. For example, b may be con-
sidered as a more sensitive issue where an explanation against the
majority will not be accepted by the agents.
a b x = (a ∧ b)
1 0 0
1 1 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
a b x = (a ∧ b)
1 1 1
1 1 1
0 0 0
1 1 1
Table 17: Revised Conclusion-Based Procedure
We do have strong and weak premise independence, which fol-
lows directly from the definition. However, we do not have inde-
pendence of irrelevant propositional alternatives, as illustrated in
Table 17. The agent judgments on proposition a are the same, but
the collective judgments on the proposition are not. Since also the
collective judgments on the conclusion x are distinct, the example
does not violate the premise independence assumptions.
The example illustrates that we do not have a dictator, because in
the first table the collective judgment coincides with the judgment
of the third agent, whereas in the second table it coincides with the
judgments of the first two agents. Finally it follows directly from
the definition that anonymity is satisfied.
4.4 Conclusion dictator
A conclusion dictator is an agent in the group such that, what-
ever her opinion on the conclusion, it will be adopted as the group
judgment on the conclusion. As for the collective judgments on the
premises, a takes the same evaluation as the collective conclusion
unless there is a unanimous judgment for a.
a b x = (a ∧ b)
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
a b x = (a ∧ b)
1 1 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 1 1
Table 18: Conclusion Dictator
We do have strong and weak premise independence, which fol-
lows directly from the definition. However, we do not have inde-
pendence of irrelevant propositional alternatives, as illustrated in
Table 18. The agent judgments on proposition a are the same, but
the collective judgments on the proposition are not. Since also the
collective judgments on the conclusion x are distinct, the example
does not violate the premise independence assumptions.
The example illustrates that we do not have a dictator, because in
the first table the collective judgment coincides with the judgment
of the last two agents, whereas in the second table it coincides with
the judgments of the first agent. Moreover, it follows directly from
the definitions that anonymity is satisfied.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We study independence in judgment aggregation by examining
a large set of benchmark examples from the literature, where we
observe that to model these examples we have to distinguish be-
tween premises and conclusion. This is surprising, since judgment
aggregation has been developed as a generalization of preference
aggregation in Arrow’s social choice, and there does not seem to be
a need to distinguish premises from conclusion in the benchmark
examples of preference aggregation such as Condorcet’s paradox.
This suggests that there is a fundamental distinction between judg-
ment aggregation on the one hand, and preference aggregation on
the other hand. The distinction is also absent in related probabilistic
examples such as the lottery paradox [11].
We consider the role of independence in the impossibility re-
sults in judgment aggregation. The systematicity property of the
first judgment aggregation framework of List and Pettit has already
been weakened to independence of irrelevant alternatives and, by
Mongin, to the independence of irrelevant propositional alterna-
tives but, together with a unanimity assumption, it still leads to an
impossibility result. We extend Mongin’s framework with a dis-
tinction between premise, intermediate and conclusion variables,
and we use the extended framework to define notions of indepen-
dence that take the distinction between premise and conclusion into
account. In particular, we define:
1. A strong notion of premise independence, where the aggre-
gated premise propositions depend on the agent judgments
of this proposition, as well as on the aggregated conclusion
propositions.
2. A weak notion of premise independence, where the aggre-
gated premise propositions depend on the agent judgments
of this proposition, as well as on the agent and aggregated
conclusion propositions.
3. A strong notion of conclusion independence, where the ag-
gregated conclusion propositions depend on the agent judg-
ments of this proposition, as well as on the aggregated premise
propositions.
4. A weak notion of conclusion independence, where the ag-
gregated conclusion propositions depend on the agent judg-
ments of this proposition, as well as on the agent and aggre-
gated premise propositions.
Since in most cases there will be several premise propositions and
only one conclusion proposition, as in the running example of the
doctrinal paradox or the discursive dilemma, the first two assump-
tions will be more often used than the latter ones. Of the first
two, the strong notion already enables several interesting opera-
tors, which we illustrate using the revised conclusion procedure
and the output dictator. In both cases the aggregation may in some
cases depend on the aggregated conclusion. For example, the out-
put dictator ensures that the joint decision is always determined by
himself, but he allows the other agents to influence the explanation
why his decision is justified.
More independence assumptions can be defined if we also take
the intermediate variables into account. In the same way as we
defined premise and conclusion independence, we can define inde-
pendence notions that make a premise proposition depend on the
intermediate propositions only, on both the intermediate proposi-
tions and the conclusion propositions, and so on.
A topic of further research is to apply our framework to actual
judgment aggregation problems of agents, and to develop a logic
to specify judgment aggregation problems. In particular, the logic
of judgment aggregation developed by A˚gotnes et al. [1] can be
extended to cover Mongin’s framework, and our extension with
premise, intermediate and output propositions. For example, such a
logic could be used to give a formalization of Chapman’s informal
analysis of judgment aggregation problems using modes ponens
and modes tollens [3]. Moreover, graphical representations of in-
dependence between variables can be used, as in Bayesian, causal
and utility networks, to have more detailed representations of de-
pendencies between variables, and formal logics for independence
can be used to reason about such detailed independence models.
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